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Care as a Goal of Democratic
Education
MAUGHN GREGORY
Montclair State University, NJ, USA

In this article I present behavioural analyses of particular constructions of democracy and the ethic of care, in order to determine whether care is a democratic virtue. I analyse
Carol Gilligan’s concept of care as a complex of six virtues or behavioural dispositions:
acquaintance, mindfulness, moral imagining, solidarity, tolerance and self-care. I then describe
democracy in terms of two divergent but compatible sets of practices: social non-interference and
social co-operation. These behavioural analyses lead me to conclude that certain behavioural
habits that partially constitute a person’s or a community’s caring also partially constitute that
person’s or community’s democracy. Speci cally, the caring virtues of acquaintance, mindfulness, moral imagining and self-care also belong to the virtue of democratic co-operation, and the
caring virtue of tolerance constitutes the democratic ideal of non-interference. However,
solidarity of conscience and private purposes is not itself a democratic ideal, and to try to make
it so would violate the democratic ideal of non-interference. Since most of the virtues of care I
identi ed are also virtues of democracy, they are appropriate aims of public education. The
enculturation of caring and democratic virtues requires that children practise the kind of inquiry
in which these ideals are constructed.
ABSTRACT

1. Introduction: on behavioural analysis of concepts
The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit, and different beliefs
are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise.
If beliefs do not differ in this respect, if they appease the same doubt by
producing the same rule of action, then no mere differences in the manner
of consciousness of them can make them different beliefs …
[T]he whole function of thought is to produce habits of action … for what
a thing means is simply what habits it involves … [T]here is no distinction
of meaning so  ne as to consist in anything but a possible difference of
practice (Charles Sanders Peirce, 1878 [1]).
Is caring a democratic virtue? Is education that is directed toward habituating
teachers and learners to pursue democratic ends by democratic means thereby
committed to fostering dispositions for empathy and solidarity as well? To answer
these questions I will  rst present a behavioural analysis of care, and then show how
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only certain caring behaviours are compatible with (indeed, are necessary for)
certain democratic practises.
Charles Peirce’s famous contention that the ultimate meaning of a concept is
some difference in our habits of behaviour, may effectively lead us to develop
behavioural conceptions of virtues we prize enough to make them goals of public
education; I mean the cognitive and social norms we have judged to be vital to our
children’s preparation to become full- edged citizens and people. Examples of such
behavioural analysis may be found in the work of Lipman, Sharp and others whose
studies of higher-order thinking involve the identi cation of “cognitive virtues” such
as impartiality and consistency, which can be elucidated in terms of making certain
kinds of moves or following certain procedures [2]. Behavioural analysis is one way to
clarify the meaning of inherently vague concepts such as inquiry, democracy and
care, especially in  elds such as education, applied ethics and law, where philosophy
is often consulted to guide practice. To formulate a behavioural conception of
democracy, for example, is to operationalise principles such as “religious pluralism”
and “equality before law” into procedures and behavioural dispositions. Another
advantage of behavioural analysis is that it is a useful way to compare and relate the
meanings of ideas, emotions, values, ethics, desires, relationships, commitments and
so on, because it trades them all for the same currency: actions, procedures and
habits. Also, as Peirce explained, since behaviour may be collective and collaborative, and since groups of people develop habits of interactive behaviour (including
cognitive behaviour), our behavioural analyses will be useful in evaluating virtues
practised by communities as well as by individuals. The pragmatic thrust of Peirce’s
behaviourism is that a behavioural disposition is only a virtue or a vice in relation to
some purpose, such as rational deliberation, scienti c inquiry or democratic decision-making.
In this article I will attempt a behavioural analysis of the notion of care, in order
to show in what ways and to what extent it constitutes a virtue in relation to the
practice of democracy. I begin with a behavioural interpretation of Carol Gilligan’s
concept of care, not because her conception is de nitive, but because it is robust and
multifaceted [3]. I present it as a somewhat arbitrary starting point against which
other notions of care may be contrasted.
2. Caring Behaviours
Gilligan’s ground-breaking book, In a Different Voice: psychological theory and women’s
development [4], reported the  ndings of her research in human moral development.
Gilligan found that, on the whole, women and men in her culture aspired to
different moral paradigms [5]. Gilligan was at one time an associate of Lawrence
Kohlberg, whose paradigm of moral reasoning—characterised by dispassion, impartiality and universalised conceptions of rights and justice—Gilligan found to be
favoured more by the men than by the women she studied. Kohlberg himself used
his paradigm to diagnose the caring, relationship-based moral reasoning of many
women and girls as immature. Gilligan’s thesis is not the simple reverse of
Kohlberg’s—that his male-orientated paradigm is less mature than the paradigm
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favoured by the women Gilligan studied. Rather, Gilligan discusses the strengths of
both paradigms, and concludes that the two complement each other—that in fact,
each paradigm needs the other to curb its excesses, correct its misdirections and
compensate for what it lacks [6]. Men would do well, that is, to become mindful of
what effect their blind calculations of rights and justice, and their  erce assertions of
independence have on the network of human relationships in which they live, while
women would do well to give their ideas, desires and interests (their “voices”) equal
dignity, consideration and emphasis to the ideas, desires and interests of others,
especially other men. The ethic of care constructed by Gilligan incorporates elements of both of these paradigms.
I will now describe six virtues that I take to be elemental to Gilligan’s ethic of
care: acquaintance, mindfulness, moral imagining, solidarity, tolerance and selfcare. I will begin a behavioural interpretation of these virtues: I will suggest a
number of behavioural dispositions and procedures that realise them. Most of the
behaviours I mention should be understood as suf cient but not necessary instances
of caring virtues.
To be caring is,  rst of all, to be aware of the network of human [7] relationships in which one is involved and secondly, to consider the effects of one’s actions
(including speech and very subtle actions such as facial expressions) on the people
to whom one is socially related [8]. For Gilligan, the notion of atomistic individualism–that it is possible to live detached from others—is not only false but also
dangerous. Even the articulation and the practice of justice require awareness of
human relations [9]; and a caring person will not always exercise the rights that
justice grants her: she will sometimes give others more than they have the right to
expect from her [10]. Acquaintance becomes a virtue when it is instantiated in
habitual behaviours such as noticing, imagining [11], naming, remarking on and
communicating with others. The goal of acquaintance is simply awareness of the
other people our conduct may affect. Therefore, the scope of this goal is indeterminate. There is no way to follow the ripple of effects caused by our conduct, to know
who will be affected. In the law of torts, this obscurity gives rise to the standard of
proximate cause, which we may adapt: a caring person is one who makes herself
aware of the others she might reasonably expect to affect.
By mindfulness I mean consideration of the ways in which our conduct affects
others. Mindfulness constitutes a continuum of attention, ranging from the attention
we give to how our action may affect any random, generalised other, to the closer
attention we give to how we affect the particular people we know well, e.g. our
family, friends, colleagues and neighbours. General mindfulness requires that we
regard others in their universality; close mindfulness requires that we regard others
in their particularity. A more intense, more involved level of care is appropriate
among people who know each other well, and requires special sensitivity—a closer
mindfulness of one another’s special needs and interests. Gilligan notes that many
of the games young girls play in her culture “foster the development of the empathy
and sensitivity necessary for taking the role of ‘the particular other’ and point …
toward knowing the other as different from the self.” [12]
The virtue of mindfulness—of both the general and the close
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varieties—is exercised in behaviours such as inquiring into and articulating others’
needs and interests, especially those that are different from one’s own. The aim of
this virtue is understanding, which is only indirectly evidenced by the behaviours of
mindfulness. Understanding is also demonstrated by behaviour that cannot be
explained without it—such as behaviour that embodies the subsequent caring
virtues.
It is one thing to understand the peculiar claims of suffering and ecstasy of those
around us, and another to actually sympathise with those claims: to suffer with
people who suffer differently, and to be happy with people who  nd happiness in
ways very different from our own. Gilligan recommends a radical sympathy that is
not measured in the liberal moral theory of equality. To respect a person’s autonomy, even to defend her right to pursue peculiar interests, is not the same as
attempting to share those interests even long enough to help her pursue them.
Rather, as Richard Rorty has observed:
Human solidarity … is to be achieved not by inquiry but by imagination,
the imaginative ability to see strange people as fellow sufferers. Solidarity is
not discovered by re ection but created. It is created by increasing our
sensitivity to the particular details of the pain and humiliation of other,
unfamiliar sorts of people [13].
Solidarity means helping others to reach their goals, whether these be vital
needs, urgent desires or pie-in-the-sky dreams. It is the element of solidarity—the
commitment to act on behalf of others—that most people identify with the notion
of caring, although our analysis shows this to be only one element and, as I will
argue presently, not even a necessary element. The practice of solidarity presupposes
the practices of acquaintance and mindfulness. The process of caring is the same for
strangers and for intimates: we keep ourselves aware of when and how we interact
with them; we seek to understand them as far as is practical, we attempt to
empathise with what they must need or want from our interaction, and we act to
ful ll that need or want, unless we decide that doing so would violate our own
conscience. As Nell Noddings describes:
[W]hen we struggle toward the reality of the other … [w]e also have
aroused in us the feeling, “I must do something.” When we see the other’s
reality as a possibility for us, we must act to eliminate the intolerable, to
reduce the pain, to  ll the need, to actualize the dream. When I am in this
sort of relationship with another, when the other’s reality becomes a real
possibility for me, I care [14].
Our solidarity with others means either that we have become converted to their
ways of life—so that the same things make all of us happy or miserable—or that we
empathise with them suf ciently to suffer and celebrate with them. The former is a
solidarity of conscience, an example of which would be my conversion to your
religious doctrines, so that I come to share your peculiar concerns about the morality
of our community. An example of the latter would be a devout Christian who is
happy to join in Jewish religious celebrations, and who observes relevant dietary
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rules when entertaining devout Jewish friends. While these different types of solidarity are often realised in different types of behaviour, both are also realised in our
pursuit of needs and interests claimed by others.
Moreover, both kinds of solidarity preclude didactic, paternalistic or pastoral
care—the kind that presumes to address needs and interests of the person being
cared for does not countenance—no matter how sincerely intended. Consider the
brutal ministrations made by 16th-century Franciscans to Yucatan Mayans, in the
name of Christian love, as related by Friar Diego de Landa:
After the people had been thus instructed in religion, and the youths
bene ted as we have said, they were perverted by their priests and chiefs to
return to their idolatry … Upon this the friars held an Inquisition …, they
held trials and celebrated an Auto, putting many on scaffolds, capped,
shorn and beaten, and some in the penitential robes for a time. Some of the
Indians out of grief, and deluded by the devil, hung themselves; but
generally they all showed much repentance and readiness to be good
Christians [15].
May [the Mayans not] return to their misery and vomitings of errors, thus
falling into worse case than before, returning the evil ones we have been
able to drive out of their souls, out of which with so laborious care we have
been able to drive them, cleansing them and sweeping out their vices and
evil customs of the past [16].
The distinction of the elements of care I have derived from Gilligan helps me
be precise in my condemnation of the Franciscans in this case. Presumably, their
failure was not one of acquaintance; and clearly, it was not one of mindfulness—for
it seems the Franciscans appreciated, in qualitative detail, their impact on the
Mayans. Nor do I believe it was a failure of care for the Franciscans not to embrace
Mayan religion and morality. Rather, their breach of the ethic of care lay,  rst, in
their failure to even attempt to see Mayan ways as legitimate, even for Mayans, and
secondly, in using force rather than persuasion to change Mayan beliefs and
behaviour. The  rst was failure of moral imagining, the second a failure of tolerance.
Gilligan’s ethic of care, in contrast to some others, only demands that solidarity
be attempted, through moral imagination, and not that it actually be achieved. The
requirement that we sympathise with all claims of suffering and happiness would rest
on the absurd assumption that all private moralities are ultimately commensurable:
that they can all be  tted together in a uni ed view of the good life. Since this is
clearly impossible, it follows that to care for others requires only an honest attempt
at solidarity, i.e. an effort to imagine that what others claim is good and bad, really
is, or at least, is for them.
The virtue of moral imagining requires that we reserve judgement on the
peculiarities of others brought to our attention by our practice of acquaintance and
mindfulness, and that we exercise our reason, imagination and good will in the
attempt to empathise with those peculiarities. Solidarity may be attempted by many
means: imagining such peculiarities as belonging to ourselves; studying their causes;
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seeing our own needs and interests as peculiar, broadening our exposure to the
chaotic history of human purpose and desire. These means may be pursued in
literature and art, in anthropology and history, in thought experiment, travel and
intimate conversation.
When moral imagination fails to achieve solidarity (as it has failed for me, for
example, regarding white and Christian supremacy, and certain forms of addiction),
then we may still care for others by committing to use only persuasion and never
force, to win their solidarity: to try to convert them to our own view of what is good
for them. This commitment is the basis of the virtue of tolerance, and while it is not
the kind of care we hope to share with intimates, it is precisely the kind that we may
expect and demand from our fellow democratic citizens. Tolerance, then, is almost
a negative virtue, in that it describes the quintessential democratic disposition to
refrain from interfering with the pursuits and pastimes of others, no matter how
abhorrent to us, that do not themselves prevent the same scope of liberty to others
[17].
Behaviourally, tolerance is evidenced as much by the absence of repressive
actions as by the practice of non-discriminatory procedures. Of course, arrangements for reciprocal political and social non-interference may be motivated more by
self-regard than by care for others, but either motive is suf cient. The willingness to
give all kinds—and very different kinds—of people the political and social room to
pursue what is important to them, although we ourselves may not be able to
appreciate those pursuits, because we see that otherwise we will cause them to suffer,
is surely a kind of compassion.
Finally, to be caring is not to be completely sel ess in every case for, as Gilligan
observes, “to be sel ess means not to be in relationship” [18]. Gilligan characterises
“the age-old opposition between sel shness and sel essness” as a false dichotomy
[19]. The ethic of care she constructs recognises the needs and interests of everyone
in a relationship network (including the caring self) who must creatively balance the
con icting claims of “compassion and autonomy”, “virtue and power” [20]. Gilligan
does not argue (as do some Taoists and Christians) that a suf ciently caring person
will  nd a perfect balance to strike in every situation of competing needs; only that
in such competitions the needs of the caring self should not be habitually slighted.
It was this virtue of self-care, so strongly emphasised in Kohlberg’s ethic of justice
and autonomy, that Gilligan found to be less habitual among the women than
among the men of her culture. For these women, Gilligan recommended such
practices as articulating their own needs, interests and desires and negotiating them
on a more equal basis with the needs, interests and desires of others.
3. Two Democracies
I have described the ethic of care as a complex of virtues, or behavioural dispositions. Now, in order to relate care to democracy, I must also describe democracy in
the currency of behavioural habits. I have found it useful to think of democracy as
two systems of practices that are compatible but not necessary to each other: one a
system of social non-interference and the other of social co-operation. Richard
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Shusterman has written about these different conceptions of democracy, in defending John Dewey’s conception (which emphasises social co-operation) against
Richard Rorty’s (which emphasises social non-interference) [21]. Although I disagree with Shusterman’s  nding that these conceptions are incompatible, I have
been instructed by his exposition of them.
Rorty’s democracy is characterised by the capitalist values of extreme individualism, vast personal liberty and freedom from too much association. Rorty uses the
phrase “private morality” to refer to visions and pursuits of self-realisation, whether
they be temporary or life-long, whether they be hobbies or whole ways of life (ways
of whole lives), and whether they be pursued by individuals, clubs, congregations or
entire cultures. “Public morality” means politics: the way one justi es using social
power to coerce others; and Rorty explains that democracy is the public morality
that attempts to be neutral among con icting private moralities. That is, democratic
people only interfere with each other’s private moralities when those moralities
become undemocratic by threatening other private moralities.
In Dewey’s socialist democracy, individuals derive meaning and purpose from
association, and so construe their political freedom positively: as opportunities to
pursue the bene ts of associated life:
Dewey [elaborated] his vision of liberal democracy … in terms of basic
human desires for consummatory experience, growth, self-realization, and
community, and in terms of the need for collaborative effort to achieve
greater frequency and security for these desired ends in a changing contingent world whose future can in some measure be in uenced and improved
by human action and experimental intelligence [22].
I take Dewey’s advocacy of “the positive sense of freedom as empowerment to
lead a better life” [23] to be a prediction that, given the chance, people will  nd the
best use of democratic freedoms to be cultural habits of mutually bene cial social
interaction; but then for Dewey, social empowerment was a means to individual
freedom of conscience:
Earlier liberalism regarded the separate and competing economic action of
individuals as the means to social well-being as the end. We must reverse
the perspective and see that socialized economy is the means of free
individual development as the end [24].
Shusterman himself  nds individual development to be the goal of both Dewey’s
and Rorty’s democracy:
Dewey and Rorty agree that self-realization is the highest value for liberal
democracy and that such self-ful llment is distinctively individual and
aesthetic. Realizing oneself is not a matter of ful lling any  xed general
essence of human or citizen, conforming to a predetermined moral or
social formula legislated by nature or society. It is rather a particularized
creative project of individual growth, a Nietzschean project of becoming
what you are, by using one’s particular conditions, talents, inclinations,
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and opportunities to mold oneself into a richer, more attractive person who
will enjoy more satisfying and rewarding experiences with greater frequency
and stability [25].

However, this kind of self-realisation requires, besides the empowerment of
social collaboration, the freedom to associate and disassociate with others, as we see
 t, in the pursuits we deem most worthy. The positive freedoms of association,
co-operation and collective growth presuppose the negative freedoms of not being
told how, when and for what purposes to associate. A democracy of non-intervention,
like Rorty’s, is therefore both logically and practically prior to a Deweyan democracy
of collective  ourishing. Indeed, Rorty’s only point in differentiating an arena of
public morality from the arena of competing private moralities is that if the latter are
not privatised, they become oppressive. The only constraint Rorty sees democracy
putting onto private moralities is that they acquire their converts by persuasion
rather than by force [26]—which is presumably his re-wording of Dewey’s idea that
liberalism means using experimental intelligence rather than force to determine
collective action [27]. Without the habits of restraint that follow from Rorty’s
division of public and private morality our collective pursuits can become undemocratic, whereas, without the habits of meaningful collaboration envisioned by
Dewey, our democratic society can become sterile and cruelly competitive.
The behavioural interpretation of democracy I shall begin here will re ect this
distinction between democratic principles of non-intervention and bene cial association. I will describe a separate set of behaviours for each principle. I believe a
behavioural interpretation of these principles is more useful than a strictly conceptual interpretation, for demonstrating that association presupposes non-intervention.
At times I will describe procedures rather than behaviours; but then a procedure is
only a rule for behaviour that has been adopted by some community. The fact that
these procedures are written down, so that sometimes in discussing them we make
reference to texts rather than to actual human conduct, does not make them any less
appropriate to behavioural studies, as long as the procedures are rules for how to act
and not how to think or what to believe. Of course, a community that aspires to
democracy should monitor continually the democratic quality of both its formal
procedures and the actual habits of human interaction that form within it.
To begin with, the ideal of non-intervention is realised by the establishment of
relatively value-neutral procedures for facilitating the pursuit of private moralities.
The distinction Rorty wants to maintain between the public and private moralities
is another way of describing a procedural, as opposed to a substantive democracy—a
distinction I believe to be as necessary as it is indeterminate. A procedural democracy is one in which there is general agreement on procedures for free speech,
universal franchisement, the separation of church and state, rules of evidence, and
so on—procedures that are neutral to the content of private moralities, e.g. religious
or political platforms. In substantive democracies there is no such neutrality: citizens
may use governmental power to sponsor or aid the pursuits of private moralities that
gain a majority of collective support. This distinction is naõ¨ve, of course, because
there is no such thing as a value-neutral procedure; but I also believe this distinction
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is one we cannot do without, because democracy depends on the identi cation of
procedures that are at least relatively value-neutral, in that the only values to which
they are opposed are those against democracy itself: for example, Fascism. Assuring
each citizen as much freedom of conscience as is compatible with the same freedom
for all, is the value behind this distinction. This is one reason I like Rorty’s
characterisation of democracy as one kind of “public morality”, for it is a morality—
a normative stance, a choice of values—but it addresses a different sphere of moral
choices than is addressed by each individual’s “private morality”, or vision of
perfection [28]. Democracy aims to make the kind of public moral choices that will
least interfere with our private moral choices:
The spiritual inner man, his motives and his deepest impulses are not only
no business of public authorities; they ought not to concern his fellow
citizens, especially his ideological opponents, or even people who do not
share his system of associations, background, and loyalties (Judith Shklar)
[29].
Some of the procedures that facilitate democratic nonintervention are, as I have
mentioned, free speech, universal enfranchisement and so on. It has been the
business of American courts and legislatures for centuries to spell out the behavioural policies and practices that realise these procedural ideals. One example is
the decision that no level of government that issues parade permits in the course of
regulating traf c may discriminate against any applicant for such a permit on the
basis of the content or message of the parade.
More interesting, perhaps, than the rules of democratic institutions are the
patterns and habits of interpersonal behaviour among their members. The ideal of
non-intervention in such behaviour is to avoid using force—including legislation,
violence, fraud and fallacious reasoning—to win adherence to one’s private moral
views and practices. The alternative is persuasion. A person who, when offended at
the way her neighbour worships, is inclined to speak to her neighbour about it rather
than to her legislator, has developed a democratic disposition. A related disposition
is to oppose undemocratic uses of force: to notice coercion and object to it.
Take just one other example of how this dichotomy functions. It is one thing for
a Mormon woman to ask herself, as a Mormon, what are her proper roles in her
marriage, her family, her religious community, and her society. It is quite another
thing for the same woman, as a citizen of a democratic society, to ask herself which
of these roles her society should disallow or discourage. As a Mormon, the woman
may decide that her spiritual ful llment lies in a domestic life rather than in a career
outside the home; she may even believe, further, that what is true for her, in this
regard of spiritual ful llment, is true for all women, all of whom share a feminine
spiritual nature; but as a member of a democratic society she may only attempt to
persuade other women to follow this view. She is not entitled to coerce them herself,
or to have public force used in that attempt, in the event people of her persuasion
attain majority status.
The distinction between persuasion and force is indeterminate. It is obvious
that hate crimes and rioting are undemocratic means of pursuing private moral
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visions, and that writing books, appearing on talk shows and participating in other
forms of public dialogue are not overly intrusive. However, the democracy of many
behaviours is contestable, especially many kinds of social activism, such as picketing,
boycott, sit-ins and hunger strikes. Is it persuasion or force to follow a woman out
of an abortion clinic and persist in verbal confrontation with her whenever she enters
public space? The same American courts that have protected offensive speech
against attacks by people in whom it has only caused psychic pain have also upheld
legislation against verbal harassment. Different communities may evolve this distinction in different ways and be equally democratic, so long as they have evolved either
procedures or collective habits (or both) of pursuing the distinction, through inquiry
and social reconstruction, in order to maximise freedom of conscience. Democratic
communities are communities that, among other things, constantly worry that their
individual and collective behaviours may cause someone’s conscience to be forced.
It is easy to formulate a behavioural interpretation of Dewey’s concept of social
co-operation, since that concept was modeled on the habits of scienti c communities. Dewey and Rorty have both taken the purpose of social life to be individual
self-realisation, of which there is no authoritative [30], teleological standard [31].
They have both asserted that self-realisation is an open-ended, Darwinian process of
growth and adaptation to the changing possibilities we encounter in our environment. Dewey saw that this kind of growth requires above all two things: variety in
the environment and adaptability—openness to change—in the individual. Dewey
saw that both of these were easier to achieve among co-operative communities than
by individuals, and like Peirce before him, he found that communities of scientists
had evolved useful habits of interaction that cultivated both variety and adaptability.
Variety means that potentials for change in the natural and social environment
are not arti cially or dogmatically limited. In scienti c communities this ideal is
realised by the standards of free and open inquiry that isolate scienti c research from
the sanctions of church and state. These correspond, in democratic communities, to
the procedures and practices of non-intervention I have discussed, which facilitate
an ideological and cultural pluralism. Adaptability is the ability to grow by discerning the meanings, selecting from the opportunities, weighing the risks and usefully
employing the materials our natural and social environment has to offer. In science,
adaptability involves such inquiry skills as discerning aberrant phenomena, investigation, imagining new hypotheses, careful reasoning, honest experimenting and
self-correction. Each of these skills is collective as well as individual. That is, many
communities of scientists have developed habits of collective discernment, reasoning, etc. and have found their collective inquiries to be more ef cacious and more
bene cial to each member than the isolated inquiries of any individual. This is
because, normally, no individual can see as many possibilities or notice as many
fallacies as a group of people looking for the same things. People with similar goals
and standards can correct each other’s mistakes and model their strengths for each
other, so that not only can members of the community grow by learning from each
other, but also the members can grow as a community, by learning how best to
interact—to divide their efforts, to compensate for each other’s weaknesses and
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build on each other’s strengths—so that a strong community can actually practise
virtues that none of its members can practise themselves.
Dewey urged that our societies become more democratic by attempting to
structure just this kind of social co-operation—particularly in schools—in which free
citizens join in like-minded communities to draw more growth from one another
than any of them could achieve on her own. Whether we are restructuring a school
system, writing a tax law, raising a family, hunting a virus or interpreting poetry, our
results will be better and our personal virtues (talents, capacities for growth) will be
more developed if we make these attempts as communities. When Dewey called for
closer public association as the means to every individual’s self-realisation he was not
advocating a collective private morality, in which the members of a society socialise
one another towards a common standard of self-realisation. Nor was he merely
espousing the socialist doctrine that fairness requires the social assurance of equality
of opportunity (which, of course, he was). He was enacting the pragmatist view of
personal development, in which the conditions of personal growth are best cultivated not by people but by societies.
It does not follow that there is any public obligation to support, further, or
otherwise care for private pursuits one does not share. Democracy does not require
us to make every cause our own. After all this talk about the bene ts of close social
co-operation, I want once more, and brie y, to raise Rorty’s distinction between
pursuing a collective private vision and pursuing a public vision. A public (political)
vision is pursued by citizens acting as the engineers of society, and the result will be
executed by the government, by force. If they are democratic, this vision will be
limited by the principle of non-intervention: citizens will not be tempted to lend
their public authority to this or that private cause. A collective private vision is
pursued by people who are not acting as citizens, at least while they pursue it, but
as Mormons or skinheads or jazz enthusiasts or Disney stock-holders or Jane Austen
buffs or Queer Nation radicals or Mothers Against Drunk Driving. Some of these
communities are alarmingly powerful but again, if they are democratic they will not
be tempted to use their power in coercive ways. This does not mean that private
concerns should not be discussed in public space. On the contrary, public discussion
of private views is as important to the function of democratic society (in terms of
mutual understanding and accommodation) as it is to personal ful llment (the
construction and clari cation of personal meaning). It only means that what private
groups do in public space should never amount to forcing someone’s conscience.
Democracy provides the un-coerced arena in which people with divergent private
passions attempt to persuade one another about what is important—about what they
should care about.
4. Is Care a Democratic Virtue?
I hope that bringing many ideals of care and of democracy into the currency of
behaviour has already made some of their areas of similarity obvious. Now, on the
basis of this behavioural analysis, I may assert my thesis: the relationship between
caring and democracy is identity among certain of their respective behaviours. I do

456

M. Gregory

not claim that caring action is a prerequisite for, or conducive to democratic
interaction, or vice versa, but that certain behaviours and behavioural habits that
partially constitute a person’s or a community’s caring also partially constitute that
person’s or community’s democracy. I say “partially” because there are behaviours
and habits that belong to care and not to democracy, and vice versa.
The behaviours named by the caring virtues of acquaintance, mindfulness and
moral imagining also belong to the virtue of democratic co-operation—speci cally,
the virtue of adaptability, or mutual growth through social inquiry. These behaviours
include noticing, imagining and communicating with others, inquiring into and
articulating the needs and interests of others, imagining the peculiar desires of others
as belonging to ourselves and broadening our exposure to human experience. I think
it is obvious that this kind of examination and experimentation is as relevant to
thorough social inquiry as to thorough interpersonal care, and that any community
in which these practices become habitual is as likely to experience practical,
co-operative social improvement as the emergence of strong and varied foci of
solidarity.
Solidarity itself, of the types I have described, is not properly a democratic goal.
That is, the intense interpersonal caring that is manifest in people taking up one
another’s burdens and causes is certainly conducive to all the ideals of democracy I
have named and, in fact, is facilitated by the democratic procedures I have described; but such solidarity of conscience and private purposes is not itself a
democratic ideal, and to try to make it into one would violate the democratic ideal
of non-interference. By democratic procedures and habits, citizens exert pressure on
each other to conform their political views and habits to democratic standards, but
do not pressure them to homogenise their private views in deference to any particular
value system, or for the sake of solidarity itself. On the contrary, democratic
practices positively disallow citizens from coercing each other that way. Altruism,
sacri ce, compassion and love, in so far as their behaviours are distinguishable from
the democratic behaviours of non-interference and of social co-operation, belong to
the realm of private morality, and are not properly the objects of political concern.
Democracy leaves us free to pursue them or not; democratic authority must stand
indifferent. Politicians who offer their constituents moral leadership and mean more
than the civic morality of democratic interaction, or who use their positions to
attempt to unite their constituents under any collective credo, no matter how
innocuous, either do not understand or openly  out the democratic ideal of social
non-interference.
Tolerance, on the other hand, is a quintessential democratic virtue: its practice
constitutes the ideal of social non-interference [32]. As such, tolerance is related to
the democratic goal of cultivating pluralism for the sake of co-operative growth.
Moreover, tolerant behaviours are an important part of the process of social inquiry
for growth. It emerges, as Dewey saw, that the same tolerant dispositions and
procedures that are necessary for our political freedom are equally necessary for
thorough inquiry. Tolerance facilitates the marketplace of ideas, in which we
sometimes pro t from the successes of others involved in pursuits we at  rst
consider misguided or distasteful, and in which others sometimes pro t from
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mistakes we make in pursuits we begin with bravado and  nd unworkable. Also, the
disposition to resort to persuasion rather than force in cases of con ict very often
tempers our own convictions, for it necessarily engages us in dialogue from which
few of us ever withdraw with all our beliefs and reasons intact, and from which
genuine public concerns may be formed. In short, a community of citizens with
different moral ambitions, who aim for inclusiveness and who accommodate each
other in their divergent pursuits (as far as those pursuits are politically compatible),
is the ideally fertile ground for personal and collective growth.
The virtue of self-care is similarly relevant to both the cultivation of variety and
the process of collective growth through inquiry. As Ayn Rand has asserted, without
suf cient self-regard our unique insights and desires may not be articulated, and
thus have no chance to be explored, tested, extended or nurtured by our community. It is the community as well as the individual that suffers from this loss of
voice. Without variety, inquiry is sti ed. This was the page of evolutionary science
that Dewey took from Darwin: since variety cannot be planned, the more homogeneous a society, no matter how rigorous its process of inquiry, the less potential it
has for improvement. Similarly, the process of collaborative inquiry depends on each
member of the community criticising and re-creating ideas and practices from her
unique perspective. The cognitive virtue of impartiality proscribes self-effacement as
much as self-absorption. Consider the prominence of self-regard in Matthew Lipman’s conception of caring thinking:
When we are thinking caringly, we attend to what we take to be important,
to what we care about, to what demands, requires or needs us to think
about it. Higher-order thinking, in other words, is not value-free … Caring
thinking is not content merely to classify; it must rank and grade, assign
priorities, distinguish between what is urgent and what is not. Lurking
behind one’s valuations is always one’s sense of proportion, that idiosyncratic perspective in terms of which some things appear to one to be close
by and huge while other things seem to be ever so far off and of minuscule
dimensions [33].
Without suf cient self-regard a person may be unwilling to participate in the give
and take of thorough inquiry. Indeed, the behaviours of self-care I mentioned—articulating one’s desires and negotiating them fairly with others—are equally important behaviours of inquiry.
5. Conclusion: moral education
The behavioural dispositions, or virtues, we value enough to educate are those
without which, we have judged, it would be neglectful to allow our children to make
their way through life. There is no such thing as education that is value-neutral (even
norms as universal as reading and hygiene bespeak particular values), and so all
education is a form of enculturation. As behavioural analysis makes clear, enculturation is more than the acquisition of knowledge but less than indoctrination, for the
very nature of ideals such as reason, care and democracy is that they must be wilfully
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chosen and practised. Of the six virtues of care I have identi ed, all but one are also
virtues of democracy—either the public democracy of social non-interference or the
private democracy of social co-operation for mutual growth—and are therefore
appropriate aims of public education. If our children are to willfully choose and
practise these ideals we have chosen to educate, they must be included in the process
of inquiry by which these ideals are identi ed and constructed. The exercise of
behavioural analysis might be one fruitful aspect of such inquiry. As programmes
such as Philosophy in the Schools attest, children are eminently capable of discussing such queries as: “What kinds of things does a fair person do?” “How does
a real friend act?” “How can I show that my community is tolerant?” “Is what’s good
for me the same as what’s good for you?” “I know this is a safe place when
such-and-such happens.” The operationalising of concepts such as fairness and
friendship at once help children to concretise them as actions they may carry out,
and to appreciate their complexity and inherent vagueness.
However, behavioural analysis, such as I have begun in this article, suggests that
democracy and care are less subjects to be learned than habits to be acquired. Moral
education must therefore provide students with opportunities, not only to inquire
into them, but also to practise them. Ideally, inquiry and practice should run
together: moral inquiry should alert students and teachers to the moral dimensions
of their experience, including their shared experience. Students and teachers should
seek opportunities to experiment with moral conduct, should re ect on their
conduct and practice the moral strategies they  nd most meaningful, with a view to
becoming pro cient in them and to developing them into habits. The combination
of inquiry and action would mean that students and teachers construct (and
reconstruct) democratic virtues, simultaneously as concepts and as dispositions.
The overlap of caring and democratic virtues means that communities that
practise the kinds of care I have described will necessarily be democratic to some
extent, and vice versa, but the overlap is not complete. There are important
distinctions to be made. I am concerned that advocates of various ethics of care have
promoted virtues such as sympathy, altruism, sacri ce and love, as aims of didactic
moral education, claiming that they are necessary for democratic society. I have
shown to what extent I believe this is true: democracy imposes on its adherents the
public obligation to treat one another with the consideration, respect, and sometimes the tolerance, that will allow all private pursuits (i.e. individual and collective
pursuits that do not threaten democratic pluralism) to thrive. Apart from that,
however, democratic authority must not be used to promote caring virtues espoused
by private communities.
Of course, within democratic societies there will be private communities that
aspire to private caring virtues, just as there will be communities that aspire to
private ideals of art, eros and hate. Many of these communities will not also aspire
to be democratic in themselves, and this is not necessarily a problem for the
democratic societies in which these groups function. All kinds of non-democratic
private communities form around private credos: the Anglican Church, the Boy
Scouts, the Council for Secular Humanism. Democracy does not require these
organisations to be democratic in themselves by practising the democratic be-
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haviours I have identi ed. The Boy Scouts, if they can show that they are truly a
private organisation and do not rely too much on government support, may refuse
admittance to homosexuals and atheists. Democracy merely requires that the practices of such private communities  t within the democratic practices of the larger
society. In most cases all this means is that private communities remain strictly
voluntary: that civic institutions lend them no of cial sanction or preference, and
that disaffected members be free to leave them—in short, that no one’s participation
is forced. In the classroom, this means that while it is appropriate for school
authorities to acknowledge and in some ways accommodate private moral agendas
constructed by students conducting moral inquiry in the school, the school, as a
civic institution, must treat this as an instance of private solidarity. The school must
be seen neither to prefer nor to discountenance such agendas, and must regulate that
all students are free to associate or disassociate with such agendas.
I am alarmed at how forthrightly people will abandon democratic principles
when it comes to public moral education. School programmes for religious instruction, character education, good citizenship and intercultural empathy very often
cross the line that separates public from private enculturation. This is due in part to
the fact that in many respects young children are not considered full citizens capable
of making considered moral judgements, but didactic moral education can only
atrophy their capacity to make such judgements. Only the practice of moral inquiry,
including re ective conduct, can increase that capacity. This kind of education
requires that we do not present virtues as closed or  nal; that we talk to our children
about the contingent origins of these virtues, the limits of their applications and the
history of their adaptations; that we share our curiosity about how they might need
to be adapted in the future. It also requires that as adults we not permit ourselves
to perpetuate our values by appeal to our own authority, whether or not it is backed
by aggression. The inclusion of children in the process of value inquiry obliges us as
adults to be up-front about our reasons for preferring certain virtues, and obliges us
to give fair-minded consideration to counter-values presented by children.
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